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Is spiritual experience the best way to account for the host of newer religious
sensibilities that are cropping up, in enabling the crossing of borders between older
religious systems that scatter the cultural landscape as the newer intolerances that
have taken their place? In order to offer a theoretical angle on the question of
spiritual experience I want to deal with four issues: secularism, post-structuralism,
the utopian possibilities of religion, and what I want to call, following Ernst Bloch
(1972), the discernment of myths.
The specific issue relating to post-secularism is the widespread denigration of
“religion” in favor of “spirituality.” No one, it seems, wants to be religious any
more; no one, in fact has been religious for a good time now; in popular parlance,
worship halls reek of incense gone rancid, moth-eaten robes, and empty temples,
whether Jewish synagogues or Hindu stupas. However, what one can be is spiri-
tual, removed from any institutional taint, free to pick up lost forms of spirituality or
any variety of the new forms that spring up daily. If I add that spirituality now is
characterized by bricolage and eclecticism, that it expresses a deep desire to be free
from political as well as institutional taint, then we have a definition of spirituality.
It is, in other words, the properly late capitalist and consumerist approach to reli-
gion. The popularity and valorization of the spiritual is so often taken as a mark of
the new post-secular order, and religion has become the bogey term. The seemingly
rapid appearance of such a distinction hit me while teaching in 1999. In a course
entitled “Culture, Religion and Spirituality” I found that not one of the students in
the course would admit to being religious: if they were anything, it was spiritual,
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and that ranged from to indigenous spirituality to the notion that all the great
religious leaders (Zoroaster, the Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed, etc.) arrived and de-
parted on a passing comet to the usual crystals and pyramids and conservative
Christian churches.
The utopian dimension of my title refers to the desire to find or develop a shared
language of spiritual experiences that does not ride roughshod over cultural differ-
ence. It seems to me that, ironically, one of the most neglected areas of the study of
religions or of spiritualities is that of utopia, for religions contain a vast wealth of
utopian images, hopes and aspirations. This leads to the essay’s final topic, the
discernment of myths, since if we are to undertake a utopian hermeneutics of reli-
gious traditions or spiritual experiences, then a crucial task is the discernment of
those myths. Here I assume that religion and spirituality inevitably deal in the realm
of myth: those that are repressive, violently intolerant, racist, and misogynist, as
well as those that offer resistance to such repressions and hint at alternative possi-
bilities.
Secularism and Post-Secularism
The new spirituality is often taken to be a mark of post-secularism, but that begs
the question of post-secularism itself and its relation to secularism. I am thinking
here of the problems concerning any such distinction: whether the “post” signifies
a temporal distinction; or whether the notion of post-secularism, itself a debated
term, offers a critical perspective on secularism; or whether post-secularism itself is
constituted by a new awareness, one after the fact, as it were, of the whole debate
concerning secularism. My preferred approach is the last one, for as with the aware-
ness of realism or modernism, the moment of such awareness, the ability to speak
about and criticize a certain moment of cultural production, marks a shift to another
position. But this understanding of post-secularism means that it is dialectically
connected with secularism, that the two cannot be understood without each other
in a complex relationship. It seems to me that this dialectical relationship operates
by means of contradictions, post-secularism thereby showing up the contradic-
tions within secularism itself. In what follows I trace the contradictions of secular-
ism in order to show how post-secularism constitutes the working out of such
contradictions.
More than the ban of priestly hocus-pocus and enforced ignorance, what we
now assume to be secularization - the gradual removal of religion - was itself a
debated term in the nineteenth century until the theories of Max Weber and Karl
Löwith began to dominate, which are of course the ones we tend to ascribe to now.
But there were other theories of secularization. Let me take as an example that of
Walter Benjamin, whose interpretation in The Origin of German Tragic Drama
idiosyncratically converted Weber’s thesis in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
of Capitalism as well as Löwith’s in From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in
Nineteenth-Century Thought. For Benjamin, secularization was the fall away from
historical - that is, theological - time, into space and spatialization, an inauthentic
and excessive shift under the influence of the natural sciences. Over against theo-
logical or messianic time, Benjamin described this dehistoricized and spatialized
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time as “natural history,” marked by classification, taxonomy and topology (see
Hansen 1998). In many respects Benjamin illustrates the issue at stake in seculariza-
tion, namely that the criticism of religion that continues today is in a very specific
sense the criticism of Christianity as the most dominating form of global religion. In
other words, the ban on religion was in fact a ban on Christianity, for secularization
itself was both enacted and theorized in a Europe steeped in Christianity.
The nature of this debate over secularization, upon which I have touched all too
briefly, points to a feature of the term religion itself. In the studies of religion - the
preferred term among most university departments or programs over against theo-
logical colleges with their explicit theological agendas - religion is often understood
as the generic term for the beliefs and practices relating to the ultimate reality or
supramundane realm, beyond everyday human experience. However, religion as a
term has its own peculiar history that belies such a generic meaning. I am not so
much interested in the Latin origins of the term - re-ligio, or “binding back” - but in
the work of the early theorists of religion such as James Frazer and F. Max Muller.
Frazer”s multivolume study, The Golden Bough (1925-30), still appears in its abbre-
viated form as reprints in bookshops, whereas Muller”s translations of Hindu and
Buddhist texts in the Sacred Texts of the East (1883-1910) ran on well beyond his
own work to include a whole range of Hindu, Buddhist and Muslim texts that still
appear in the odd library. Both gathered their material, which might best be de-
scribed as enormous catalogues or inventories, from the accounts of missionaries,
travelers and the early entrepreneurial traders. The impact of their work on an
emerging capitalist Europe was immense, showing the extraordinary wealth and
diversity of religious belief and practice in the so-called new lands that were con-
tinually being “discovered.” But they cast the material they gathered, however
bowdlerized, misrepresented and truncated it might have been, in terms and catego-
ries that were fundamentally Christian. It is not so much that they used the major
categories of theology - harmatology, anthropology, Christology or eschatology -
but that the structures of Christianity, its institutions, the distinction between belief
and practice and so on, became the organizing principles of their work. Thus, all
Frazer’s focus on the so-called fertility myths in which the key god or goddess dies
and then rises in a perpetual cycle was determined by the patterns of the Christian
liturgical calendar with its cycle from advent through Christmas, Epiphany, Lent,
Easter, Pentecost, ordinary time and then back to Christmas again, in which the year
follows the birth, death and resurrection of Christ. In a similar fashion, William
Robertson Smith’s still influential theory of sacrifice - that it contains two moments
of propitiation of the god or gods and then communion when the worshippers
share between them and their god(s) the body of the sacrificial victim - draws its
material from the Hebrew Bible (Old Testament). This should come as no surprise,
given Robertson Smith’s former life as a lecturer in Old Testament in the Free Kirk of
Scotland.
This is not a particularly new argument - that the term religion is indelibly under-
stood in Christian terms - but I want to draw two points from it. First, the develop-
ment of the whole area of the study of religions is part of the secularization process
itself, which can now be understood as the transition of categories from Christian
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thought and practice into all of those new areas that built themselves up through
the rejection of Christianity. Whether we think of the role of Christianity in the
development of the sciences or of the study of literature, the forms, categories and
questions asked were derived from Christian theology and biblical practice while
the content itself was denied and rejected. Christianity was, in other words, the
enabling force, the absent cause of these secularized disciplines and realms of
social and cultural life. So also with the study of religion, which became the study
of religions other than Christianity in Christian terms.
Lest we think of this as a benign process I want to pick up Adorno’s criticism of
secularization, especially the secularized theology that he found in Kierkegaard,
Heidegger, existentialism, liberal theology more generally and metaphysics. Let me
take the example of existentialism: in part due to the centrality of Kierkegaard in
existentialism, Adorno finds the theological residue (Kierkegaard being primarily a
theologian) of existentialism poisonous. Its “‘addictions’ have seeped into the
language,” a language which “molds thought” (Adorno 1965, 8). And this is the
problem: it is not as though the content floats free of its container, language, but
that language itself has its own shaping, content-producing function. The lan-
guage of theology, appropriated by Heidegger and existentialism, has the distinct
ideological role of producing patterns of subordination to an absolute authority,
which became fascism rather than God and the Church. The theological language of
existentialism - which drew its sacredness from the cult of authenticity rather than
Christianity – becomes, for Adorno, an ideological schema particularly suited to
fascism, for which it functioned not so much as an explicit statement, but as a
“refuge,” a mystification that gave voice to an ostensible salvation from alienation
that functioned as a virulent justification of oppression, the “smoldering evil”
(Adorno 1965, 9) of fascism. Adorno would repeat this move at various points in his
work. For example, he shows how a critique of idolatry that lies at the heart of the
famous ban on images (Bilderverbot) of the second commandment in Exodus 20.
The ban on images, or as Adorno transmuted it philosophically, das
Nichtbegriffliche, the “non-conceptual,” works its way through Negative Dialec-
tics and Aesthetic Theory, but Adorno develops his famous criticism of the concept
through the critique of idolatry that is at the heart of the ban itself. In other words,
if you get rid of theology and its authority structures, i.e. God, but continue to use
its structures and ways of thinking, then the authority and power that formerly
rested with god or the gods is transferred to something else — a philosophy,
political figure, a cause or passion — all of which become so many idols. The full
circle comes with the study of other religions, where instead of surreptitiously
replacing god with something that does not have the traditional trappings of the
divine, you begin to replace one god with another in an endless pattern. That the
new gods appearing on the horizon have the contours of the God you have just left
behind: the dogmas, images, institutional structures and conceptual apparatus of
Christian theology.
Secularization then becomes a process riven with contradictions, one whose
rejection of Christianity relies on Christianity, and this, I would suggest, is one of
the main reasons for the fact that secularization never quite seemed to succeed – as
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in the radical separation of church and state in the United States where religion
ends up saturating the state, or in France where the state takes over the role of
moral arbiter and ends up banning Muslim headscarves. The long held expectation
of the eventual decline and disappearance of religion that is characteristic of both
Marxism and liberalism, never quite took place. And it is this contradiction that
unfolds in what is now called post-secularism. Now, that religion carries with it the
bad odor of the whole history of secularization. The flowering of the myriad forms
of religious expression and experience for which the secularization hypothesis
could not account is instead described in terms of spirituality, the properly post-
secular religion. I don’t want to trace the Christian history of the term “spirituality,”
but one of its features is that it relies upon the widespread knowledge of a whole
range of religious practices that would not have been possible without the study of
religions in the first place, without the endless cataloguing and study of religions
from the most ancient, such as Sumeria and Babylon or pre-historic humans, to the
most contemporary forms, such as the well-known Heaven’s Gate group that com-
mitted suicide, all shod with Nike shoes, when the comet Hale-Bopp appeared on
earth’s horizon. Apparently emptied of doctrines to which one must adhere, or of
institutions that carefully guard salvation, or of specific groups bound by language
and ethnic identity, spirituality enables one to recover lost or repressed practices,
such as Wicca or Yoruba sacrifice, but to pick and choose elements that seem to
suit individual lifestyles or predilections. It allows one to designate the vitality of
indigenous religions (which are no longer religion but spirituality), as a lost source
of connectedness with the land, with nature, or other human beings. Unfortunately,
however, spirituality’s private piety and devotion comes at the expense of any
collective agenda. It also relies on both liberal pluralism and tolerance, as well as the
profound reification of social and cultural life that is everywhere around us. You
can practice your own particular spirituality in your small corner, as long you don’t
bother me, we say.  Like secularization, spirituality itself depends upon its own
contradiction: both rely upon the religion they reject.
Utopia
But have I not been a little too negative, too critical of spirituality? I am not
interested in an apology neither for the older notion of religion - that should be clear
enough - nor even for the institutional life of a marginalized Christianity. But what I
do want to do is pick up the second aspect mentioned above, namely utopia. For I
want to follow Ernst Bloch, for whom the moment of ideological suspicion is incom-
plete without a utopian hermeneutics, or a hermeneutics of recovery (although I
prefer utopia over recovery for reasons that will become clear below.) What is often
forgotten is that the hermeneutics of suspicion and recovery in political approaches
such as feminism, post-colonial criticism and liberation theology owe a debt to
Bloch. It seems to me that the effort to locate a shared language of “spiritual
experience,” one that is sensitive to variations of social, political and cultural differ-
ence, relies upon a utopian project in the best sense(s) of the term. However, before
I pursue this part of my argument, let me say a few things about such a utopian
hermeneutics.
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Bloch’s lifelong project was the recovery of the very idea of utopia, drawn from
the Bible itself, particularly when it had been successfully relegated to the realm of
the dreamy and impractical. Through many detours and byways, both physical and
mental, Bloch winds his tortuous way around the question of what it means to have
hope. We might distinguish between the philosophical, hermeneutical, literary and
aesthetic dimensions of Bloch’s utopian project. As for philosophy, utopia be-
comes a philosophical principle that Bloch was able to lift from the literary text and
cast over any object, cultural, political, sacred or economic. In doing so, Bloch
sought to answer the tendency for utopias to regress, to long for a lost golden age.
In these regressive utopias there is a contradictory process of forgetting and re-
membering: the past becomes the basis for utopia by means of denying the role of
the past in determining the present system against which the utopia is posited. In
other words, the future is but a return to pristine origins, bypassing the undesirable
present. When utopia and restoration become identical, one has the hallmarks of
regressive and reactionary utopias (which eventually reveal themselves as
dystopias.) Over against the longing for a restored past, Bloch argued for a basic
orientation to the future as characteristic of utopian thought, of the human psyche
and society. If there is a utopian moment in what is felt to be the past - Eden or
Paradise, the secret guild of masons who look back to Solomon’s temple as the ideal
model, the Island of the Blessed, Atlantis, and so on - then the energy for that
moment derives not from the past, according to Bloch, but from the utopian vision
of the future. He sought a discovery of the future in the past, understood in the
sense that what may have begun in the past requires the future for its completion.
The central philosophical category in Bloch’s system is therefore the future, the
novum, a radical openness to a future that cannot as yet be imagined, formulated, or
even spoken about.
Alongside the philosophical category of the future, where one can debate the
relative truth claims of different utopias, there is also the hermeneutical category.
As opposed to the philosophical, a utopian hermeneutics seeks the various unex-
pected utopian fragments and glimpses in the ruins of the present. In all its multi-
farious forms, this is the thread that runs through the whole corpus of writing, a
hermeneutics that searches everywhere - in literature, folklore, myth, architecture,
nursery rhymes, popular culture, music, of all ages and places - for the hope of a
better world. For Bloch it is less a particular doctrine of thought than a hermeneuti-
cal strategy in itself, a frame of reading that locates utopia even in the worst ideo-
logical and cultural products available. In such a dialectical strategy many negative
and unredeemable items turn out to conceal a positive and utopian moment. In
other words, the negative is crucial for the presencing of the positive: only by
means of an oppressive moment can the positive emerge. Yet even the moments
that presage a utopian future do so not through their immediate content but through
their finite nature. Hope drives forward less through the future that is anticipated
than by dissatisfaction with the present. Further, Bloch’s continual and irrepress-
ible desire was to read all he came upon as in some way marked by a utopian desire,
a repressed wish for another, better world.
I want see whether the desire to develop a shared language of spiritual experi-
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ence may also be understood in a utopian fashion. Does this get us away from the
institutional traps and cul-de-sacs of religion that seem to close down so many
efforts at crossing the boundaries? One of the problems, it seems to me, is that
religions present us with mutually exclusive world-views. But I am anticipating an
argument to which I will turn in a few moments. Does spiritual experience get us
beyond these problems? In short, I don’t think so, unless the terms are radically
emptied of their old meanings and loaded up with new ones (something I think is
not possible either). There are too many problems with the notion of “spiritual,” let
alone “experience.” First, spiritual experience cannot be understood outside the
mediating influence of its institutional, cultural and historical situation. We can’t
shed these to find ourselves left with an unmediated experience. Second, the notion
of spiritual experience itself has a distinct history in Western Christian thought.
One of its most influential theorists, Rudolph Otto (1929), argued in what is still an
influential text, that the signs of encountering the Other, the mysterium, are feelings
of awe and wonder, tremendum et fascinans. But Otto was writing in a context
influenced by the long tradition of German piety, and while he tried to develop a
theory that was not explicitly Christian, it works very well as a way of understand-
ing the Christian encounter with God. Third, as I have already suggested, spiritual
experience relies too much on both empiricist assumptions regarding experience
(the domain that is most true and therefore not to be questioned) and the valoriza-
tion of the individual person.
Have I left Bloch behind in my criticism of “spiritual experience”? Is there no
utopian dimension to the effort to speak one language, or at least one that is open
rather than closed? Rather than spiritual experience, a more fruitful approach is the
question of myth. If the post-secular era has brought to our attention a whole spate
of new spiritualities, then it has also brought myth back onto the agenda. Most
importantly, myth is the language both religions and spiritualities speak.
Even more than religion per se, the Enlightenment target of secularization was
myth, a term that had acquired an unwieldy cluster of associations: untruth, confu-
sion, fuzzy thinking, the ideology of oppression, and so on. Myth found itself
driven from town to town, expelled by the enlightened burghers, only to retreat to
the forests and deserts, the realm of Nature, where a few wayward individuals might
have some use for it. Faced with the use of myth by the Nazis and other sundry
fascists, with their notions of blood and soil and the Blond Beast, Walter Benjamin
and Theodor Adorno saw only the negative aspects of the term. For Benjamin, the
ultimate form of myth was capitalism, as he traced in The Arcades Project (1999),
and so he sought a way beyond myth, a waking from the dream, that made use of
biblical motifs. Unfortunately, he remained trapped within the myth of the Bible
itself. For Adorno (1999), myth was the antithesis of utopia. Myth was the realm of
the unitary principle, the abolition of non-identity that is characteristic of a world
dominated by men. For both Adorno and Benjamin, utopia meant the end of myth.
The Discernment of Myth
From my perspective, Bloch provides a far more satisfactory approach to myth.
I want to pick up his strategy of the discernment of myth, a dialectical reading that
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neither throws myth out wholesale nor takes myth as a positive dimension of
human culture. For Bloch, myth is neither pure false consciousness that needs to
be unmasked, nor a positive force without qualification. Like ideologies, all myths,
no matter how repressive, have an emancipatory-utopian dimension that cannot be
separated from deception and illusion. Thus, in the very process of manipulation
and domination, myth also has a moment of utopian residue, an element that opens
up other possibilities at the very point of failure. Bloch is particularly interested in
biblical myth, for the subversive elements in the myths that interest him are enabled
by ideologies both repetitious and repessive.
Bloch’s most lucid discussion of the role of myth comes in his debate with the
radical theologian Rudolph Bultmann, who proposed a program of demythologiza-
tion of the Bible and theology. In place of a program such as Bultmann’s, Bloch - no
stranger to myth, fairy-tale and related genres - feels that it is the purpose of such
materials that counts rather than the pre-scientific ideas they contain. Do they
speak of transformation and liberation? Do they have cunning heroes who win
through a ruse? But this requires some distinction within the broad category of
myth — too often a blanket term without specificity, lumped together by Marxists
and others in Angeles’s phrase, “the imbecility of the primeval forest” (Bloch 1985,
vol 9, 339) — between the despotism and domination of myth proper and myths
that, like later fairy-tales, subvert such domination (see also Bloch 1988, 163-85).
The story of Prometheus in Greek mythology, or of the serpent in Paradise in the Bible,
gives voice to this “fairytale” element in. I think Bloch would much prefer to keep both
the conformist and non-conformist elements of myth rather than no myth at all, since
the banishment of myth discards the “joyful message,” the “deepest utopian theme”
(Bloch 1985, vol 9, 343) of mythology along with all that is oppressive.
If the first step of his argument is to seek out the purpose of myth in order to
make a political distinction, his second step involves distinguishing further be-
tween types of myth. In part, this is because Bloch does not want a wholesale
recovery of myth, for this would render him an anti-Enlightenment thinker beyond
the wide circle of Marxism. So fear, ignorance and superstition may go, but give expres-
sion of the quality and wonder of nature should not. Fairy tale, legend, saga and myth
become separate entities (see also Bloch 1985, vol 9, 344-5). By invoking Greek art, science
(Kepler) and the Romantics, Bloch is processing myth through dialectics - “destroying and
saving the myth in a single dialectical process” (Bloch 1985, vol 14, 67).
At his best, Bloch’s discernment of myth is an extraordinary approach, for it
enables us to interpret the myths of any religion or spirituality as neither completely
reprehensible nor utterly beneficial. That is to say, it is precisely through and
because of the myths of dominance and despotism that those of cunning and non-
conformism can exist. It is not merely that we cannot understand the latter without
the former, but that the former enables the latter. Let me conclude with two examples
of the discernment of myth drawn from Bloch’s reading of his favored text, the
Bible. The first concerns Eden and the second death. Eden is for Bloch a paradigm
for utopia (Bloch 1995, 758-94). The point of discernment here is that Eden is not so
much a story of some ideal state in the past that is forever unattainable but an image
of the future for which we strive. After seeking Eden, he concludes: “Eldorado-
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Eden therefore comprehensively embraces the other outlined utopias” (1995, 793).
But Eden cannot be separated from the idea of a Promised Land, which he suggests
precedes the Babylonian garden story borrowed by the Israelites, nor from the New
Jerusalem, when Eden will be restored. But Bloch is interested in the way Eden
remains a physical, geographical space, a garden to which entry is forbidden though
searching for it and living close by are permitted. This unfallen natural space is
remarkably mobile, often connected with other legends, but Bloch finds it in Jerusa-
lem, (in Dante), India (in the broadest possible sense), Prester John’s Indian king-
dom, the voyage of St Brendan and St Brendan’s Isle, in the Atlantic (which was
often read as India), in what drove Columbus (who believed that close to his newly
found “India” was Paradise, which would soon lie within Christendom,) in the
south land, terra australis, in the icy north of the kingdom of Thule, within the
Earth and beyond the stars.
If Eden seems obvious as a utopian paradigm, then Bloch’s deliberations over
death show his discernment of myth at full power. They are among the most honest
of any secular thinker that I have seen: for Bloch, “death depicts the hardest anti-
utopia” (Bloch 1988, 9). As “a highly inadequate end, generally breaking, only very
rarely rounding off, the human life” (Bloch 1972, 249), it saps the energy of anyone
who sets out to change the world. Eschewing a solution in a collective notion of
continued life, Bloch distinguishes between the act of dying, which is itself part of
life, and death as the resultant state. The former generates the odd apprehension,
but the mythical status of death engenders sheer horror. So Bloch seeks to cut
through this mythology to locate a source of courage in the look forward to the
Novum. He does nothing less than recast the myth of death as a departure, an open
question. Interested in neither the “positive dogmatism” of Christianity nor a mate-
rialist “dogmatic negativity,” he comes out as an agnostic regarding death: the
journey is simply an unknown, and anyone who attempts to say what actually takes
place has another agenda. Rather than the traditional image of the resurrection to a
new life or indeed the retrospection that immanent death produces, he stresses that
death should be regarded as an open question for which we have no answers.
Atheism, therefore, does not preclude the possibility of something beyond death,
for “the status viae lies far beyond death, which hardly represents an inflexibly
formative status termini” (Bloch 2000: 265).
In the end, then, the value of religions like Christianity is that they have tapped
into this utopian desire for something beyond death. Their mistake for Bloch is that
they want to say something definite about death. But that something is hardly
definite: it is mythology, and for that we need a discerning eye that can see both the
liberating and repressive features of those myths.
Conclusion
If we follow through the dialectical relationship between secularism and post-
secularism - a contradictory logic in which secularism turns out to rely on the
Christianity it everywhere denies, a logic that appears starkly in a post-secularism
that cannot be thought without secularism - then myth turns out to be the most
urgent religious or spiritual question for us. Rather than the problem-ridden term
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“spirituality”, I have argued that Bloch’s hermeneutics of the discernment of myth
provides not only a productive method, but also an approach to the utopian desire
that lies behind any effort to find a shared “religious” or “spiritual” language. Such
a language needs to be both critical and appreciative, for myths work in an ex-
tremely cunning fashion. It is a process that enables on the one hand the identifica-
tion of those myths, or even elements within a myth, that are oppressive, misogy-
nist, racist, that serve a ruling elite, and on the other, those which are subversive,
liberating and properly socialist or even democratic — in other words, utopian.
Works Cited
Adorno, Theodor W.. Jargon der Eigentlichkeit; Zur deutschen Ideologie.
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1965.
---. The Jargon of Authenticity. Trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will.
Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
---. Negative Dialectics. Trans. E. B. Ashton. London: Routledge, 1990.
---. Aesthetic Theory. Trans Robert Hullot-Kentor. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1997.
---. Dialectic of Enlightenment (with Max Horkheimer). Trans. John Cumming.
New York: Continuum, 1999.
Benjamin, Walter. The Origin of German Tragic Drama. Trans. John Osborne.
London: Verso, 1998.
---. The Arcades Project. Trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin. Cam-
bridge, MA: Belknap, 1999.
Bloch, Ernst. Atheism in Christianity. The Religion of the Exodus and the
Kingdom, Trans. J. T. Swann; New York, Herder and Herder, 1972.
---. Werkausgabe.16 volumes. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985.
---. Utopian Function of Art and Literature: Selected Essays. Trans. Jack Zipes
and Frank Mecklenburg. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1988.
---. The Principle of Hope.Trans. N. Plaice, S. Plaice and P. Knight. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1995.
---. Literary Essays. Trans. Andrew Joron and others. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1998.
---. The Spirit of Utopia. Meridian. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2000.
Boer, Roland. Marxist Criticism of the Bible. London: Continuum, 2003.
---. The Criticism of Heaven. Leiden: Brill, Forthcoming.
Bultmann, Rudolph. Theology of the New Testament. London: SCM, 1952-55.
Docker, John. 1492: A Poetics of Diapora. London: Continuum, 2001.
Eliade, Mircea. The Myth of the Eternal Return. Trans. Willard R. Trask. New
York: Pantheon, 1954.
---. Myth and Reality. London: Allen and Unwin, 1964.
Frazer, James. The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion. 12 volumes.
London: Macmillan, 1925-30.
Hanssen, Beatrice. Walter Benjamin”s Other History: Of Stones, Animals,
Human Beings, and Angels. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998.
Boer     45
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. The Savage Mind. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966.
---. The Raw and the Cooked: Introduction to a Science of Mythology. London:
Random House, 1994.
Löwith, Karl. From Hegel To Nietzsche : The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century
Thought. Trans. David E. Green. London: Constable 1965.
Muller, F. Max. Sacred Books of the East. Oxford: Clarendon, 1883-1910, reprinted
by Motilal Barnasidas, Delhi, 1962-68.
Otto, Rudolph. The Idea of the Holy. Trans. John Harvey, from the 9th German
edition. London: Oxford University Press, 1929.
Smith, William Robertson. Religion of the Semites: The Fundamental Institu-
tions. New York: Schocken, 1972.
Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Trans. Talcott
Parsons. London: Routledge, 2001.
